India’s new labour codes—four comprehensive laws created to replace 29 older ones—promise simplified compliance, expanded social security coverage, and greater flexibility for companies in hiring, firing, and scaling operations. But India has a long history of impressive-looking reforms getting derailed during implementation. Will the new codes fall into the same pattern?

In recent years, India’s economic reforms have gone through this same cycle:

Ambitious laws drafted in Delhi, half-baked and fragmented implementation by states, and eventually outcomes that drift far from their original intent. For example, the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) was designed as a fast and stringent mechanism to hold defaulting borrowers accountable. But soon it became entangled in judicial delays, procedural complications, and corruption. Delays and misuse of the system became commonplace.

The Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act (RERA), meant to protect homebuyers, ended up weakened by poorly designed state-level rules. Even the Goods and Services Tax (GST)—the biggest financial reform in decades—remains “work in progress,” with complex rules and uneven enforcement.

“The First Barrier: Indian Federalism”

Although the labour codes are central laws, labour falls under the Concurrent List of the Constitution. This means states must frame their own rules and handle implementation. Historically, a few states have shown diligence, but most have not. As a result, the same factory may be regulated differently in different states. While the new codes promise to fix these disparities, if states delay or interpret them in their own way, the codes will deviate from their core purpose.

“The Second Challenge: Administrative Capacity and Quality”

The codes assume that India has digital systems for worker registration, algorithms for risk-based inspections, and administrators skilled enough to manage millions of online compliances.

Reality is far weaker. India’s government machinery is typically undertrained, loosely monitored, and affected by corruption. Where digital systems do exist, they often fail under pressure. The labour codes rely heavily on digital compliance—e-filing, online grievance redressal, and Aadhaar-linked social security accounts. But India’s digital infrastructure is uneven.

Many Indian digital welfare schemes end up as databases rather than functional delivery systems. Expecting the labour codes to succeed where these schemes have stumbled appears less realistic and more wishful thinking.

“The Third Challenge: Populist Politics”

In India, reforms are shaped more by political risk than economic rationale. Politicians can weaken or postpone reforms. RERA was diluted by state amendments; GST rates were altered due to political compromises. Labour reforms, too, may undergo similar political rebalancing.

“Will the Codes Fail? Not Necessarily”

In India, reforms rarely collapse entirely. Some parts succeed, some falter, and the final result is usually an uneven, middle-of-the-road equilibrium. GST became more complicated than intended.IBC became slow and uneven. RERA didn’t disappear—just became ineffective in some regions.

The labour codes may follow the same path:

Partially successful in some states, nearly ignored in others, and inconsistently implemented nationwide. They may help manufacturing more than services, benefit large corporations more than MSMEs, and favour documented workers more than the vast unorganised majority.

“What India Really Needs: A Strong Data System”

Modern labour regulation requires massive and reliable data on employment, wages, safety, benefits, and compliance.

India’s statistics are fragmented, government records are inconsistent, and surveys infrequent. The labour codes assume the existence of a data system India simply does not have today. One reason for IBC’s failure was the government’s inability to intervene based on outcome data, coupled with overloaded tribunals due to poor appointments. RERA enforcement also varies widely across states.

Ultimately, a law is only as strong as the administrative machinery that enforces it—and India is not known for outcome-oriented, disciplined public administration.